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Abstract
Objectives: Overgeneralization has been investigated across many domains of cognitive functioning in major depression,
including the imagination of future events. However, it is unknown whether this phenomenon extends to representations
of personal goals, which are important in structuring long-term behaviour and providing meaning in life. Furthermore, it is
not clear whether depressed individuals provide less specific explanations for and against goal attainment.
Method: Clinically depressed individuals and controls generated personally important approach and avoidance goals, and
then generated explanations why they would and would not achieve these goals. Goals and causal explanations were
subsequently coded as either specific or general.
Results: Compared to controls, depressed individuals did not generate significantly fewer goals or causal explanations for or
against goal attainment. However, compared to controls, depressed individuals generated less specific goals, less specific
explanations for approach (but not avoidance) goal attainment, and less specific explanations for goal nonattainment.
Significance: Our results suggest that motivational deficits in depression may stem partly from a reduction in the specificity
of personal goal representations and related cognitions that support goal-directed behaviour. Importantly, the findings
have the potential to inform the ongoing development of psychotherapeutic approaches in the treatment of depression.
Citation: Dickson JM, Moberly NJ (2013) Reduced Specificity of Personal Goals and Explanations for Goal Attainment in Major Depression. PLoS ONE 8(5): e64512.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064512
Editor: Gerhard Andersson, Linkoping University, Sweden
Received December 14, 2012; Accepted April 15, 2013; Published May 15, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Dickson, Moberly. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: j.dickson@liv.ac.uk
Introduction
Depression has long been known to be associated with
negatively valenced thought content [1–2], but investigators have
also noted that depression is associated with a tendency towards
abstraction and overgeneralization, particularly for negative
thought content relating to the self [1,3–5]. Aaron Beck first
noted the tendency of depressed patients to overgeneralize single
negative events by thinking about their meaning in global terms,
often with pessimistic implications for the person [1]. For example,
after being involved in a minor traffic accident, a depressed person
may conclude that they are completely irresponsible, reckless and
blameworthy. Here, we investigate for the first time whether
depressed patients’ tendency to overgeneralise extends to idio-
graphic motivational constructs in the form of personal goals and
the explanations provided for, and against, goal attainment.
Because reduced motivation is a principal symptom of depression
[6], understanding the specificity of the cognitions relating to
personal goals may prove helpful in determining the nature of such
deficits.
Early cognitive theorists commented on depressed patients’
tendency to think in monolithically negative terms about
themselves and to provide overgeneralised, global attributions
for negative life events [2]. The tendency to make general (and
personal and stable) attributions for uncontrollable events (as in
the previous example) is considered to be a vulnerability factor for
depression according to the reformulated learned helplessness
model and hopelessness theory [7–8]. Empirical research indicates
that depressed patients do indeed have overgeneral self-attitudes
and make global, self-deprecating attributions for negative events
[3–4]. Depressed persons are also more likely than non-depressed
controls to overgeneralize the implications of false negative
feedback in laboratory studies [9].
The tendency of depressed persons to overgeneralise extends to
the representation of their past selves. Thus, in response to
retrieval cues, depressed persons have difficulty recalling memories
of specific personal events that took place on a particular day (e.g.,
‘the first time I visited the Eiffel Tower’), and instead tend to
report broad categories of events that abstract across several
episodic memories (e.g., ‘holidays’), relative to controls [5,10]. This
tendency to retrieve ‘overgeneral’ autobiographical memories
occurs for both positive and negative retrieval cues, predicts
maintenance of depression prospectively, and persists after
remission from depressive episode [11]. Furthermore, overgeneral
memory recall interacts with stressful life events to predict
depressive symptoms in students [12]. A developmental strategy
of affect regulation, deficits of executive control, and a tendency to
ruminate on abstract themes have all been proposed as possible
explanations for the phenomenon, but consensus is lacking on
which of these accounts best fits the data [13].
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Increasing research suggests that the cognitive processes
involved in reconstructing detailed episodic memories are also
implicated in the generation of future representations of events
involving the self [14]. Consistent with this, there is evidence that
the tendency of depressed people to report overgeneral self-
representations extends to the imagination of future events that
may occur to them. Thus, while depressed individuals generate
fewer examples of positive future events (e.g., ‘my best friend’s
wedding’) than do non-depressed controls [15–16], depressed and
suicidal people also tend to report future events that are lacking in
specific detail, compared to controls [17]. This overgenerality
effect for past and future events has also been shown in dysphoric
adults [18].
One particularly important representation of the future self is
the personal goal construct. Personal goals (e.g., ‘to pass my
driving test’) have been defined as internal representations of
desired states [19], which are important in organising long-term
behaviour and providing meaning in life [20]. Given that
episodic details of imagined future selves are more readily
generated in the context of goal-related knowledge [21–22], the
reduced specificity of future events in depression may also be
manifested in more abstract representations of personal goals
(e.g., ‘gain skills’ rather than ‘obtain an advanced diploma in
metalwork’). Although dysregulated goal pursuit has been
implicated in the aetiology and maintenance of depression
[23], a recent review [24] explicitly suggests that reduced
specificity of goal representations is a key marker in clinical
depression. However, to date, no research has tested this latter
assumption.
Although goal specificity has not previously been investigated
by comparing clinically depressed and control groups, under-
graduates who described their goal strivings in more abstract (or
overgeneral) terms reported more depressive symptoms than
those who described their goals in more concrete (or specific)
terms [25]. Another study in a non-clinical population found that
the personal goals of depressed and mixed anxious-depressed
adolescents were less specific than those of non-depressed
individuals [26]. Interestingly, this specificity deficit emerged on
approach goals representing desirable outcomes (e.g., ‘always be
popular’) and on avoidance goals representing undesirable
outcomes (e.g., ‘avoid becoming unfit’ [27]). These results, which
suggest that reduced specificity is not limited to goal content of a
particular valence, mirror findings that overgeneral memories are
equally prevalent across positive and negative events [11].
A few studies have examined the specificity of goals in clinical
populations. Recent suicide attempters generated less specific
goals, but not fewer goals, than did hospital controls, although
the depression status of these individuals was not known [28].
Recently, Crane and colleagues [29] found that suicidally
depressed persons showed increases in goal specificity after
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, compared to persons
receiving treatment as usual, and that reduced goal specificity
was significantly associated with overgeneral memory, but not
with mood improvement. This is consistent with the possibility
that depressed persons may differ from controls in the specificity
of personal goals, despite findings suggesting that they may not
differ on the number of self-reported approach or avoidance
goals [30].
Goals are organised in a hierarchy of increasing specificity from
general principles to concrete behaviours, and successful self-
regulation requires the individual to formulate specific subgoals
and plans that advance progress on more abstract goals [31].
Thus, specific goals are crucial for behavioural self-regulation as
they provide more direct links to appropriate action [32], whereas
overgeneral goal representations may be more ambiguous.
Abstract goals may also be associated with less vivid goal
attainment imagery, and this may reduce expectancies of success
[33] and the extent to which goals generate anticipatory positive
affect [34]. In combination, it is likely therefore that reduced
expectancies and anticipatory affect will reduce motivation for
goal pursuit.
Given that depression has been characterised in terms of a
hypoactive approach system and a hyperactive avoidance system
[35], one might hypothesise that reduced goal specificity in
depression would emerge for approach but not avoidance goals.
On the other hand, overgeneral autobiographical memory in
depression obtains in response to both positive and negative
retrieval cues [11], whereas another study found specificity
deficits across approach and avoidance goals in a mixed anxious-
depressed school sample [26]. In this study, we made the more
conservative prediction that clinical depression will be associated
with the generation of less specific goals across approach and
avoidance domains, relative to controls.
In order to be sufficiently motivating, goal representations
depend on positive outcome expectancies [31], which may
themselves be based upon cognitive appraisals including accessible
explanations for goal attainment. Not only do the causal
explanations people make for negative events play a crucial role
in producing depressive hopelessness [7], but the ease with which a
person is able to construct reasons for future events is thought to
play a crucial role in the subjective probability of an event [33].
Consistent with this, past research [36] has shown that pessimism
about future personal events is related to the proportion of reasons
generated for why such events may or may not occur. In another
study [37], anxious and depressed individuals gave more (‘pro’)
reasons to explain why a negative event would occur than (‘con’)
reasons to explain why it would not, the relative number of pro
versus con reasons was exactly reversed for positive events, and the
relative number of pro and con reasons was associated with
likelihood judgements for both kinds of event. A recent study of
clinically depressed individuals [30] found no significant difference
relative to non-depressed controls in the number of reasons
generated either for or against goal attainment. Nevertheless,
whereas non-depressed individuals generated significantly more
pro than con reasons for goal attainment, depressed individuals
did not. However, these studies have not examined specificity
differences in individuals’ causal explanations for goal outcomes,
which may be a crucial determinant in facilitating action toward
goal achievement, even when goals are more abstract. Reduced
specificity of explanations for, and against, goal success may reflect
impoverished representations of pathways toward successful goal
achievement. Hence, reduced specificity of explanations for goal
attainment may be associated with poorer motivation, commit-
ment and effort towards goal attainment. Our second aim is
therefore to investigate whether depressed persons’ causal
explanations for goal attainment are less specific than those
reported by controls.
In summary, we hypothesised that depressed adults would
generate less specific goals than never-depressed controls,
irrespective of whether their goals are focused on approaching
rewarding outcomes or avoiding undesirable outcomes. We also
hypothesised that depressed adults would generate less specific
(‘pro’) reasons for, and less specific (‘con’) reasons against, goal
attainment, relative to controls, across approach and avoidance
goal outcomes.
Goal Specificity in Depression
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Methods
Participants
Depressed participants were recruited from NHS Primary Care
Teams and Mental Health Trusts in northwest England. The non-
depressed participants were recruited from the Primary Care
Teams and community in the same region. The Structured
Clinical Interview (SCID I) [for Axis I Disorders [38] was
administered by trained researchers to assess the presence or
absence of current and past major depressive episodes and lifetime
psychiatric diagnoses according to Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders [6] criteria. Inter-rater reliabilities
for the trained researchers and clinical psychologist supported the
accuracy of these diagnoses (Ks = 1). Self-reported depressive
symptoms measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II
[39]) were also used to inform group membership, as described
below. In accordance with DSM-IV, exclusion criteria included
substance abuse, bipolar disorder, psychotic symptoms, head
injury, and mood disorder due to a general medical condition. The
depressed group and control group did not differ significantly on
age, t(42) = 1.27, p= .21, or gender, x2 ,1.
Depressed group. Twenty-one participants (13 women, 8
men) met DSM-IV criteria for current major depression. Ages
ranged from 19 to 74 years (M=37.9, SD =17.1). Participants
reported at least one previous episode of major depression in the
past five years. Secondary comorbid anxiety disorders included
panic disorder (n=2), social phobia (n=2) and generalized anxiety
disorder (n=2). Inclusion criteria also required participants to
score in the symptomatic range (.13) on the BDI-II at Time 1
(M=34.1, SD =11.5) and Time 2 (M=32.3, SD =11.8).
Control group. Twenty-four participants (17 women, 7 men;
aged 18 to 81 years, M=31.2, SD =17.7) had never met criteria
for major depression or any psychiatric disorder/Axis I disorder.
Inclusion criteria required participants to score in the asymptom-
atic range (,14) on the BDI-II at Time 1 (M=1.8, SD =2.2) and
Time 2 (M=2.1, SD =2.6).
Materials and Procedure
Goal Task. The next task comprised two separate, indepen-
dent measures to assess number of self-generated approach goals
and avoidance goals respectively [40]. Prompts were provided to
elicit approach goals (‘In the future it will be important for me
to…’) and avoidance goals (‘In the future it will be important for
me to avoid…’). Participants were instructed to write down
specific and discrete goals that they think will typically characterise
them at any time in the future (e.g., next week, next month, next
year, in a few years), using a separate line for each goal.
Participants have 90 s to write down as many personally
meaningful and plausible goals that come to mind in each goal
condition (approach and avoidance, counterbalanced across
participants). We imposed a time limit in each task condition to
minimise variations due to task effort. Piloting showed that the
time allocation provided in each condition was sufficient for
participants to write their response statements, as virtually no
responses were given after the 90 s time limit.
Goal Explanation Task. The final task comprised two
separate, independent measures to assess number of self-generated
reasons why participants’ two most important approach goals and
avoidance goals would (or would not) be achieved [41]. Prompts
were used to elicit reasons for (‘pro’) and against (‘con’) goal
achievement in each goal condition. Prompts in the approach goal
condition were ‘reasons why this would be accomplished?’ (pro
reasons) vs. ‘reasons why this would not be accomplished?’ (con
reasons). Prompts in the avoidance goal condition were ‘reasons
why this would be avoided? (pro reasons) vs. ‘reasons why this
would not be avoided?’ (con reasons). Participants were instructed
to write down as many plausible, specific, discrete causal
explanations that come to mind in each (pro and con) condition
for each goal, using a separate line for each reason. Participants
are given 90 s in each condition (to help control for differential
task effort) and the pro and con tasks were counterbalanced within
and across goal conditions. Following this task, participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Specificity coding of goals and explanations. Two inde-
pendent judges, both of whom were blind to condition,
dichotomously coded all goals as approach vs. avoidance and all
reasons as pro vs. con to confirm that participants generated the
appropriate goal or reason type in the relevant condition. Inter-
rater reliability for these judgements was perfect (ks = 1).
A dichotomous coding scheme was used to categorise (i) goals
and (ii) reasons as either general or specific. We used a binary
coding system because we were unable to develop a more finely-
grained coding scheme that yielded good inter-rater reliability. A
goal was coded as ‘specific’ if it described an explicit aim or target
feature and included at least one of the following specific aspects:
time, place, or people (e.g., ‘to finish completing the personal
development review forms this evening’). A goal was coded as
‘general’ if it referred to a global or abstract aspiration rather than
a specific target feature or unique experience (e.g., ‘to be happy’).
These criteria were modified slightly to code participants’ reasons
such that ‘Because I am paying into a pension each week’ would
represent a specific reason, whereas ‘Because I try’ would
represent a general reason. Inter-rater reliabilities between two
independent judges (both blind to group status) for the specificity
coding of goals and causal explanations were both good (Ks..82).
Ethics Statement. The study was approved by the Sponsor-
ship and Registration Committee and the Institute of Psychology,
Health and Society at the University of Liverpool. The study also
had ethical approval from National Health Service (NHS), the
Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC), and NHS Trust
Research Governance Committee. Informed written consent was
obtained from each participant prior to testing. The study was
conducted in accord with the British Psychological Society’s
ethical guidelines.
Statistical Procedures. No data were missing for any of our
main dependent variables. Boxplots revealed two participants in
the control group who reported high numbers of approach goals,
but winsorizing these outlying scores did not change the pattern of
significant results, so we included them in the analysis. No outliers
emerged for any other variable within each combination of group
and goal/reason type. Histograms revealed approximately nor-
mally distributed variables within each combination of group and
condition, but the proportion of specific goals exhibited marked
positive skew. Thus, in addition to the mixed analyses of variance
used to test our hypotheses, we conducted nonparametric tests on
the proportion of specific goals to confirm significant parametric
results.
Results
Proportion of Specific Approach and Avoidance Goals
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the number and
proportion of specific goals generated by each group, illustrating
that most goals were coded as general. Although not the focus of
this study, there were no significant effects involving group for
either the total number of goals generated or goal importance
ratings (ps..05).
Goal Specificity in Depression
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We submitted proportion of specific goals to a mixed ANOVA
with a repeated-measures factor of goal (approach vs. avoidance)
and a between-subjects factor of group (depressed vs. control). As
predicted, a main effect of group emerged, F(1, 43) = 10.74,
p= .002, g2p = .20, indicating that depressed participants reported
less specific goals than non-depressed controls, but there was no
significant main effect of goal, nor a goal by group interaction,
Fs,1. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests confirmed this
significant group difference, revealing that depressed participants
were significantly less specific than controls for both approach,
U=142.0, z=2.61, p= .009, r= .39 and avoidance goals,
U=135.0, z=2.81, p= .004, r= .42.
Proportion of Specific Reasons for and against Goal
Attainment
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for mean number and
proportion of specific and general pro and con reasons for
approach and avoidance goals. Despite not being the focus of the
study, there was no significant effect of group on total number of
reasons generated, p,.05. Although there was a significant group
by reason interaction, F(1, 43) = 7.46, p= .009, g2p = .15, tests of
simple main effects revealed no significant group differences on
number of either pro or con reasons (ps..05).
We conducted a mixed ANOVA on the proportion of specific
reasons with repeated-measures factors of goal type (approach vs.
avoidance) and reason (pro vs. con) and a between-subjects factor
of group (depressed vs. control). A significant main effect of group
emerged, F(1, 43) = 10.74, p= .002, g2p = .20, qualified by a
significant three-way group by goal by reason interaction, F(1, 43)
= 6.64, p= .01, g2p = .13. There were no other significant effects.
We decomposed the three-way interaction by conducting separate
goal by group mixed ANOVAs for mean proportion of specific pro
reasons and mean proportion of specific con reasons in turn. The
ANOVA on mean proportion of specific pro explanations revealed
significant main effects of group, F(1, 43) = 10.32, p= .002, g2p
= .19, and goal type, F(1, 43) = 5.07, p= .03, g2p = .11, qualified
by a significant group by goal interaction, F(1, 43) = 6.18, p= .02,
g2p = .13. Tests of simple effects to decompose the interaction
revealed that depressed participants reported proportionately
fewer specific pro reasons than controls for approach goals, F(1,
70.76) = 16.29, p,.001, but not for avoidance goals, F(1, 70.76)
= 2.10, p= .15 (see Table 2). The ANOVA on mean proportion of
specific con reasons revealed only a significant group effect, F(1,
43) = 5.52, p= .02, g2p = .11, such that depressed participants
reported proportionately fewer specific con reasons (M= .32, SD
= .22) than controls (M= .48, SD = .23) for both approach and
avoidance goals.
In sum, the depressed group generated less specific goals across
goal types and generated less specific reasons than controls for goal
attainment and nonattainment. The only exception was the
proportion of specific reasons for successfully avoiding undesired
goal outcomes, where no significant group difference emerged.
Depressed participants showed a pattern of reduced specificity
even though they did not differ significantly from controls on
either the number or importance of goals and reasons, so the
results cannot be explained in terms of a fluency deficit.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first investigation of the specificity
of goals and the specificity of reasons for and against goal
attainment generated by depressed individuals. As predicted,
compared to non-depressed controls, depressed individuals
reported goals that were less specific. Furthermore, depressed
individuals gave less specific reasons for and against attainment of
approach goals than controls, and less specific reasons against (but
not for) attainment of avoidance goals. This qualitative difference
emerged despite the absence of a significant group difference in
goal importance ratings. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed
by our correlational design, our results suggest that motivational
dysfunction in depression [6] may be underpinned by impover-
ished cognitive representations of goals. Our findings indicate that
the tendency towards overgeneralisation in depression extends
from episodic representations of the past and future self to
representations of personal goals, for both desirable and undesir-
able outcomes. This is not unexpected given that goals are thought
to derive much of their motivational impetus from specific
autobiographical memories [42], while current goals have been
argued to support the construction of specific autobiographical
memories [43].
Control theory suggests that goals may be construed at various
levels of abstraction, from abstract principles to concrete actions
[31]. According to this account, a person’s ability to shift mentally
between abstract and concrete representations of goals is crucial
for effective self-regulation. Construing goals at abstract levels
(e.g., ‘be a skilful person’) without the ability to construe them in
more concrete ways (e.g., ‘practise the piano for one hour every
evening’) may make it difficult to pursue goals effectively and
render self-regulation more difficult because goal pursuits need to
be translated into concrete behavioural tendencies. Setting specific
goals is one factor that improves self-regulatory performance [32].
Our results support the notion that an inflexibly abstract construal
of personal goals may underlie depression, further research is
required to ascertain its status as a transdiagnostic marker (e.g.,
bipolar disorder, generalised anxiety disorder [24]). Future
investigations could also examine whether goal abstraction serves
as a vulnerability factor for depression in never-depressed
individuals.
Table 1. Mean (SD) Number and Proportion of Specific
Approach and Avoidance Goals by Group.
Approach Avoidance
Specific General
%
Specific Specific General
%
Specific
Depressed 0.52 (0.75) 5.90 (2.88) 9.6 (14.2) 0.43 (0.68) 4.81 (2.36) 9.6 (15.7)
Controls 1.58 (1.41) 4.42 (2.38) 28.4 (27.0) 1.21 (1.02) 3.25 (2.19) 33.7 (32.8)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064512.t001
Table 2. Mean (SD) Number and Proportion of Specific Pro
and Con Reasons for Each Approach and Avoidance Goal.
Approach Avoidance
Specific General
%
Specific Specific General
%
Specific
Pro reasons
Depressed 0.98 (0.80) 3.31 (1.43) 23.1 (14.8) 1.45 (1.13) 2.50 (1.45) 41.1 (29.6)
Control 2.17 (0.92) 2.21 (1.41) 52.5 (25.2) 2.13 (1.06) 2.23 (1.62) 51.6 (25.3)
Con reasons
Depressed 1.17 (0.64) 3.05 (2.13) 33.7 (23.4) 1.05 (0.74) 3.07 (1.75) 30.0 (25.3)
Control 1.58 (1.02) 1.85 (1.55) 46.0 (29.1) 1.69 (1.03) 1.73 (1.14) 49.8 (24.2)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064512.t002
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Reduced specificity of goals and explanations is likely to
undermine motivation toward goal attainment and impede the
formation of a coherent sense of self [20]. Inflexibly abstract goal
representations may have other detrimental effects. For example, it
has been suggested that individuals who construe their goals more
abstractly place greater value on the importance of their goals
rather than goal attainment whereas individuals who construe
their goals in concrete forms tend to be more focused on the
process of goal attainment itself [44]. Self-regulation at an
inflexibly abstract level may increase vulnerability to sad mood
because minor setbacks are perceived as impediments to the core
values of the self. Furthermore, depressed individuals may find it
difficult to disengage from unachievable higher-order goal pursuits
that they perceive as personally important, even when failing to
make goal progress. In the face of repeated goal attainment
failures, disengagement may be adaptive [45]. Although failure to
disengage from unsuccessful goal pursuits would be expected to
instigate rumination [46], this is especially likely when goals are
represented at an abstract level [47]. Furthermore, the predom-
inance of abstract representations may foster a more abstract form
of rumination, which has been suggested to be a dysfunctional
characteristic of depressive thinking [48]. Abstract rumination
about goal pursuit may then make overgeneral representation of
events more likely, feeding a vicious cycle.
We also found evidence for reduced specificity of causal
explanations for goal attainment in our depressed sample. The
ability to generate specific explanations for goal attainment is likely
to be an essential determinant in motivating goal-directed
behaviour, because the person can more readily simulate the
desired outcome [33]. These simulations increase expectancies of
success, which then increase motivation [31]. Specific explanations
may even mitigate the self-regulatory challenges of abstract goals.
For example, a general goal ‘to be happy’ may be realised if a
person can identify specific reasons to explain why their goal will
be achieved (e.g., ‘because I have close supportive friends that I
socialise with each week’). For the most part, however, our results
showed that depressed individuals had a propensity to generate
abstract explanations for and against goal attainment and these
may themselves reinforce abstract goal representations. The
capacity to define specific reasons for, and against, goal success
is arguably a more cognitively taxing task for abstract than for
specific goals. A related possibility is that reduced specificity of
causal explanations may undermine a person’s ability to learn
from goal success and failure, hindering successful self-regulation.
Although our results revealed that depressed and never-depressed
individuals did not differ significantly in their ability to generate
specific reasons for attaining avoidance goals, we believe that
interpretation of this finding should await replication.
It is possible that reduced specificity for goals and explanations
may be a consequence of impaired executive functioning, which
limits the ability to generate personal goal details. Although
depressed individuals generated as many goals as never-depressed
individuals, it is likely that generation of specific detail requires
more executive resources than simply listing desired and undesired
outcomes, so future research should seek associations between
measures of executive functioning and goal specificity [49].
Theoretical explanations for the association between overgeneral
autobiographical memory and psychopathology [11,13] have
implicated abstract rumination and reduced executive function,
and our results suggest that these factors might also extend to
overgeneral personal goals and causal explanations in depression.
The suggestion from this literature that overgeneral memory may
develop as a consequence of an affect regulation strategy could
also be relevant for our findings. It might therefore be fruitful to
investigate whether people who have met with childhood adversity
construe their goals in more abstract terms to avoid intense
negative emotions that might accompany autobiographical mem-
ories that specific goal representations may cue [50].
Our findings clearly implicate reduced specificity of personal
goals and goal explanations in the psychopathology of depression.
Past experimental research suggests that processing style manip-
ulations affect cognitive processes. For instance, concreteness
training that aims to reduce overgeneral thinking has been shown
to reduce dysphoria [51]. Research also suggests that motivational
interventions emphasising goal concreteness, among other aspects
of goal functioning, improve well-being in a non-clinical popula-
tion [52]. Psychological therapies could do well to address the
overgeneralisation of personal goals and reasons as a psychological
deficit in depression. For instance, research suggests that
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for chronic depression
enhances the specificity of life goals and increases expectancies
for goal attainment post-therapy [29]. Psychological therapies
aimed at assisting individuals to set specific goals and to formulate
specific reasons for goal achievement may increase motivation for
goal attainment and promote adaptive self-regulation and well-
being.
Some methodological considerations of the present study
deserve comment. First, participants were required to list brief,
single-statement responses, which may partly account for the
relatively high proportion of general responses reported. Second,
in contrast to previous non-clinical studies that have examined
goal specificity using three graded categories [26], we used only
two coding categories. Therefore our specificity measure was
relatively coarse, although it was still sufficiently sensitive to detect
reliable group differences. Finally, our lack of a non-depressed
psychiatric comparison group means that it is unclear whether the
pattern of reduced specificity for goals and causal explanations is
limited to clinical depression, or would also be found in other
psychiatric conditions, reflecting a transdiagnostic marker [24].
Despite the important role of personal goals in human
experience, depression has rarely been investigated from this
perspective. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate
reduced specificity of goals and accompanying causal explanations
in clinical depression. Our results suggest that difficulties
representing specific goals and causal explanations for goal
attainment and nonattainment are implicated in the psychopa-
thology of depression. We propose that these reduced levels of
specificity may be consequential for reduced levels of motivation
and impaired self-regulation. Though the implications of these
results are currently limited by the cross-sectional design, further
research on the specificity of motivational representations has the
potential to inform the development of effective clinical treatments
for depression.
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